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As we agree with Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo
Wollmershäuser (2011a) on their basic thesis, which
says that the mechanism of Target2 balances opens a
new and very real channel for additional credit to the
GIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain), and
that it triggers involuntary capital exports of the
GLNF countries (Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Finland) without changing the monetary
base of the eurozone, we need not engage here in the
often heated debate within the scientific community.
In this paper we limit ourselves to three questions: first-
ly, we intend to supplement the past analysis of demand
and supply of the monetary base
in the GLNF countries with the
corresponding one in the GIPS
countries. In this we slightly
amend the proposed model of
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a).
Secondly, we discuss the effects of
Target2 balances on the capital
markets of the concerned coun-
tries in the framework of the New
Austrian School of Economics.
This model framework stands in
the tradition of Friedrich A. v.
Hayek’s (1929 and 1931) capital
theory and was developed princi-
pally by Roger M. Garrison
(2002). Thirdly and finally we con-
duct a static welfare analysis of
Target2 balances according to
Brakman et al. (2006). 
Target2 balances and the market for central bank
money in the concerned countries 
What are the effects of Target2 balances on the
national money markets? Like Sinn and
Wollmershäuser we assume a full allotment policy of
the ECB: the supply of central bank money is unlim-
ited in principle. The true problem variable is the
demand for money (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011a). 
In Figure 1 we present the demand and supply of base
money or central bank money as a function of the
interest rate. These refer to the countries with Target2
claims against the ECB, i.e. basically the group of
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland
(GLNF). The demand curve runs as usual from
northwest to southeast, as the opportunity cost of
holding money rises with an increasing interest rate. 
The monetary base, or central bank money, consists
of currency in circulation and the deposits of the
commercial banks at the central bank. Given the
interest rate for main refinancing operations, there is
something like a natural ceiling for the demand for
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The market for central bank money in the creditor countries (country group 




Source: Authors’ depiction based on Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a). money that in turn is determined by real income and
the payment habits of a country or likewise a country
group. As the Target2 claims against the ECB are
added to the monetary base – let us call it the sec-
ondary monetary base (= Target2 claims TC) – the
commercial banks, at a given size of their total money
demand, now demand less ‘original’ base money
(OBM1) than before. The secondary monetary base
represents new money that the national central banks
– due to the payment transactions moving via the
Target system – are forced to supply to the commer-
cial banks without granting loans (Sinn and
Wollmershäuser 2011a). The original monetary base
is created via the asset side of the central bank by pur-
chases of gold or foreign exchange as well as by the
normal refinancing operations (lending) of the central
bank with the commercial banks. 
In Figure 1 the demand for ‘true’ refinancing, i.e. orig-
inal central bank money, shifts to the left exactly by
the amount of Target2 claims (TC): without Target2
balances, the affected countries would have demanded
the amount OBM0 of central bank money completely
via regular refinancing instruments at the central
bank, while with existing Target2 claims this demand
declines to OBM1. This and nothing else is what Sinn
and Wollmershäuser – unclear for many – have called
“crowding out of refinancing credit” (Sinn und
Wollmershäuser 2011b, 19). The total demand for cen-
tral bank money remains constant, although it is now
partly met by the secondary monetary base. The deci-
sion regarding a possible ‘crowding out of refinancing
credit’ is determined by the commercial banks in the
GLNF countries and therefore
(endogenously) on the demand
side of the market for central
bank money; it is not made by the
central banks of the GLNF
countries. It is possible that the
term ‘crowding out’ in this con-
text has fed the above-mentioned
misunderstandings, as this term is
normally chosen for involuntary
rather than voluntary, i.e. self-
determined actions.
The market for central bank
money in the GIPS countries
may be presented analogously
(see Figure 2): since we defined
Target2 claims as a positive sec-
ondary monetary base, we must
now present the Target2 liabili-
ties (TL) as a negative secondary
monetary base. Whereas the Target2 claims against
the ECB create central bank money, the Target2 lia-
bilities destroy central bank money. Without the exis-
tence of Target2 balances, the GIPS countries
demand base money – at the current refinancing rate
– in the volume of OBM0. In contrast, as soon as this
country group builds up Target2 liabilities against the
ECB, it demands in addition base money in the
amount of TL. In Figure 2 this means a shift of the
solid demand curve to the right. Now the dashed
demand curve represents the entire money demand.
The distance between these two demand curves repre-
sents exactly the volume of TL. The demand for orig-
inal base money expands to the distance OBM1. In the
GIPS countries there is an inverted development to
that in the creditor countries (GLNF), where the
demand for original base money declines. 
The ECB on its part is unable to control this redistri-
bution of the European monetary base from one to
the other country group, at best if there is no full
allotment of tender operations. Since October 2008,
this full allotment has been installed: the ECB decid-
ed that the weekly main refinancing operations will be
carried out through a fixed rate tender procedure with
full allotment at the interest rate on the main refi-
nancing operation (European Central Bank 2008). In
October 2011, the ECB confirmed this policy by
asserting its intention to continue conducting its
MROs (main refinancing operations) as fixed rate ten-
der procedures with full allotment for as long as nec-
essary, and at least until the sixth maintenance period
of 2012 ends on 10 July 2012 (European Central Bank
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2011). This promise of full 
allotments does not induce the
national central banks from
Target2 debtor countries to
reduce their own Target2 liabili-
ties. Such a full allotment permits
them practically at any time and
in any amount to get original
base money from the ECB. Only
the European calendar for tender
operations represents a (weak)
limitation of their demand. 
In the next section we shall
analyse how the expanded mone-
tary base in the GIPS countries,
or the reduced demand for origi-
nal base money in the GLNF
countries, may be integrated into
the New Austrian Economics
model. 
The capital market in the model of the New Austrian
Economics and its application to the topic of Target2
balances
Figure 3 demonstrates the core of F.A. v. Hayek’s cap-
ital theory (1929 and 1931): it shows a right-angled
triangle, whose base line symbolises the time axis as
well as the consecutive steps of industrial production.
Available for this production are the factors labor and
land that can be used at any point in time for the pro-
duction of intermediate goods. The value of the inter-
mediate goods may be measured at any point in time
as the area of the triangle above the base line. The
more ‘active’ time passes, the higher is ceteris paribus
their value and the larger the area of the triangle.
The tangent of the angle α represents the implicit rent
of the accumulation and is identical to the market-
clearing interest rate on the capital market in equilib-
rium. The factors of production land, labor and inter-
mediate goods are used for the production of con-
sumer goods. The value of these consumer goods is
given by the length of the vertical side of the triangle
that, together with the base line forms the right angle.
Here the following applies: 
(1) The longer the (continuous) production process,
the larger is ceteris paribus (i.e. at a given return on
the accumulation, see above) the quantity of con-
sumer goods that can be produced from a given
quantity of original factors of production at a
given point in time.
Accordingly, we could ceteris paribus let the output of
Ci become ‘infinitely’ large, provided we were willing
to wait long enough for the corresponding consumer
good. Another special aspect of Hayek’s Triangle is
that:
(2) There is a ‘continuous-input/print-output’ phe-
nomenon: production of the intermediate goods
consumes time, whereas consumption occurs
‘timelessly’, i.e. at a certain point in time. 
Thirdly:
(3) The large the time interval between the input of
the original factors of production and the comple-
tion of the consumer goods, the more capital
intensive is ceteris paribus the production. 
Roger W. Garrison is a present-day representative of
the Austrian Economics and is simultaneously one of
the most important exegetes and interpreters of the
business cycle and capital theoretic contributions of
F.A. v. Hayek. His ‘total model’ comprises – besides
Hayek’s Triangle – a typical concave production pos-
sibility curve (see Figure 4 upper right-hand side),
which, in the style of Paul Samuelson’s presentation
in his legendary textbook Economics, does not use
two consumer goods but a (representative) consumer
good (‘butter’) and a (representative) investment
good (‘guns’). 
Figure 3  
Hayek’s Triangle 
 
Sources: v. Hayek (1931); authors’ depiction. The third building block in Garrison’s total model
(see Figure 4 lower right-hand side) represents a clas-
sical capital market like the one used also by Knut
Wicksell for his own overinvestment theory. Here it is
important that the equilibrium interest rate corre-
sponds to the natural interest rate, as long as – but
only as long as – the equilibrium is determined exclu-
sively by private savings and investment desires.
Disturbances to this equilibrium by interventionist
measures of monetary or fiscal policy generate a mar-
ket interest rate that deviates from the natural interest
rate. A weakness of the model, which concerns not
only Garrison himself but also Wicksell’s original
from 1898, is the little addressed difference between
the money market interest rate and the capital market
interest rate. The transmission of a lower money mar-
ket interest rate occurs over the lower refinancing
costs of the commercial banks that are reflected in
lower lending rates on the credit market. These induce
firms to substitute capital market financing (in part)
by credit financing with the result that prices rise on
capital markets and interest rates fall. This says noth-
ing, however, about the shape of the yield curve. 
If all three building blocks are now put together (see
Figure 4), where the total model ought to be read
from the bottom up and then from right to left, the
following is derived: equilibrium in the capital mar-
ket is where S(i) = I(i) and it initially determines the
size of investment. It should be noted that we are in
a stationary economy (I* = Ibr; In = 0); therefore
there is no net investment or an expansion of the
capital stock that would shift the production possi-
bility curve outwards. The interest-rate equilibrium
determined in the capital market also determines the
slope of the angle α in Hayek’s Triangle and at the
same time corresponds to the natural interest rate.
Once the size of the investment is fixed, then that
quantity of consumer goods is determined as a resid-
ual from the production possibility curve that is
planned by the firms and therefore is to be produced.
From the size of the equilibrium quantity of con-
sumer goods, on the one hand, and the known angle
α, on the other, we can easily determine the length of
the base of Hayek’s Triangle (because of the consis-
tency condition for right angled or any other trian-
gles that says that the sum of all angles must add up
to 180°). At the same time this determines the time
length of the production process or the number of
production steps. 
The equilibrium in Garrison’s total model can now,
regarding the capital market, be
disturbed by various events. Let
us assume, for example, that pri-
vate savings are induced by a
change in the time preference of
households: in the capital mar-
ket the supply of savings curve
will shift right (see Figure 4) and
consequently ceteris paribus the
(equilibrium) interest rate will
decline. This interest rate decline
will now further stimulate invest-
ment at the expense of the pro-
duction of (non-durable) con-
sumer goods, i.e. a move from A
to B on the production possibili-
ty curve. In Hayek’s Triangle the
value of the consumer goods
production declines in accor-
dance with the wishes of con-
sumers. At the same time the
rate of return on the accumula-
tion will necessarily decline. As a
result, the time axis becomes
longer; the early phases of the
production process lengthen at
the expense of the last phases
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that are directly directed at the
production of consumer goods.
This result corresponds very well
to the wishes of investors and
consumers so that a new equilib-
rium time structure of capital
allocation is established.
Let us now extend the macroeco-
nomics of the capital structure in
order to be able to analyse the
effects of Target2 balances. For
this purpose we create a model
framework for two countries
(country groups).
Assume two regions within the
European Monetary Union, one
(on the left-hand side of Fi  -
gure 5) that is characterised by a
high level of interest rates, com-
paratively low domestic savings
and a considerable potential for
commercial capital imports. The
other one (on the right-hand side
of Figure 5) is conversely characterised by a compar-
atively high savings rate, a low level of interest rates
and a considerable potential for capital exports. In the
following we shall analyse the scenarios below that are
relevant for the issue of Target2 balances: 
(i) the period 1999 to mid-2007,
(ii) the period from mid-2007 to 2011 in the absence
of a functioning Target2 mechanism, 
(iii) the period from mid-2007 to 2011 with a func-
tioning Target2 mechanism. 
(i) In the beginning, i.e. in the period from 1999 to
mid-2007, Target2 (or its predecessor Target)
played no significant role in the movement of cen-
tral bank money between the two regions.
Commercial capital flows financed the respective
current account balances instead. For purposes of
simplification we assume that the rest of the
world played a negligible role in this: excess
demand (ED) for savings on the left-hand part of
Figure 5 therefore corresponds exactly to the
excess supply (ES) on its right-hand side. 
As interest rates tended to converge at level ĩ(where
the interest rate in the GIPS countries moved down
from the higher level i0* and that in the GLNF
countries moved up from the lower level i0*’), point
CS (CS’) of the consumer goods supply of the
GIPS countries (GLNF countries) moved down
(up) to the right (left), whereas the consumer goods
demand point CD of the GIPS countries (CD’ of
the GLNF countries) moved up to the left (down
to the right) when investment increased (declined).
In Hayek’s Triangle there was a reorganisation of
capital in favour of longer-term (shorter-term)
investments in the GIPS countries (GLNF coun-
tries). Intermediate goods were withdrawn from
the late (early) stages of production – because here
demand weakened due to the currently low
demand for consumer goods (investment goods) –
and directed to the early (late) stages, as here a
strong demand was observable. Responsible for
this was a low (high) level of interest rates. 
This period may be roughly characterised by an
investment boom, a low level of production of
consumer goods and above-average, but unsus-
tainable economic growth in the GIPS countries,
accompanied by low investment, a comparatively
high level of production of consumer goods as
well as weak and below-average economic growth
in the GLNF countries. 
(ii) The hypothetical scenario of ‘autarky’ in both
regions (all relevant variables have now the sub-
script ‘0’) is accompanied by a relatively high
(low) natural interest rate in the GIPS countries
Figure 5  




Source: Authors’ depiction. (GLNF countries). The equilibrium points on the
respective production possibility curves are now
marked C0 and C0’, the equilibrium interest rates
are marked i0* and i0*’. This scenario is by no
means unrealistic or strange as would appear at
first glance. After all, it represents quite well the
virtual situation after 2007, when no party would
have access to the mechanism of Target2 bal-
ances. As explained by Sinn and Wollmershäuser
(2011b), after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
voluntary capital exports from the GLNF coun-
tries to the GIPS countries fell to almost zero. The
GIPS countries were no longer able to generate
current account deficits, as no voluntary commer-
cial capital inflows were available.
To be sure, neither were they able to generate sur-
pluses in their current accounts (Sell 2011).
Responsible for this was among other things the
fact that the earlier investment expenditures had
not been directed to those sectors in which com-
parative advantages were likely, but had been
focused primarily on those branches that produce
non-tradables (like real estate, local bank services,
etc.). Of course, in both regions this scenario
shows quite a different capital structure in terms
of Hayek/Garrison as (i): the natural interest rate
is now high (low) in the GIPS countries (GLNF
countries), the production of consumer goods is
comparatively strong (weak) in the GIPS coun-
tries (GLNF countries), whereas investment is
low (high). Under the conditions of this scenario
the GIPS countries (GLNF countries) could
therefore have focused more on the later (earlier)
stages of the investment process and (almost 
ex definitione) therefore could have avoided bigger
external disequilibria. 
(iii) In sharp contrast, since mid-2007 but at the latest
since 2008 the very real Target2 balances scenario
has driven a wedge between the preferences of con-
sumers and the production decisions of entrepre-
neurs. In both regions a considerable internal as
well as external disequilibrium has arisen: “toward
the end of 2010 … accumulated imports (of the
GIPS countries, the authors) amounted to …
44 billion euros. This was 12% of the entire capital
requirement created by the current account deficit.
Fully 88% was evidently financed by the Target
balances, i.e. by the money-printing press” (Sinn
und Wollmershäuser 2011b, 32). In our subsequent
analysis we further simplify things and assume that
100 percent of the GIPS countries’ current account
deficits were financed by Target2 balances.
Due to the expansionary (contractionary) effects
of Target2 liabilities (claims) on the original mon-
etary base in the GIPS countries (GLNF coun-
tries), the effective capital market interest rate falls
(rises) in the GIPS countries (GLNF countries) to
a level below (above) the natural interest rate. The
newly created (withdrawn) original central bank
money (ΔMT) now drives a wedge between savings
and investment: the consumers in GIPS countries
(GLNF countries) make their consumption deci-
sions according to their respective savings function,
analogously, the investors in both country groups
orient themselves on their respective investment
function. There now will be an excess demand ED
(an excess supply ES) for consumer goods in the
region of the GIPS countries (GNLF countries).
As demonstrated in Figure 5, the excess demand
for (excess supply of) consumer goods in the GIPS
countries (GLNF countries) combined with the
increase +ΔI (decline –ΔI) of expenditures on
investment goods in the GIPS countries (GLNF
countries) corresponds exactly to the increase in
Target2 liabilities (claims). The effects on Hayek’s
Triangle and on the capital structure in the respec-
tive regions may be summarised as follows: they
correspond largely to those of scenario (i), but in
contrast to those, the effects on the capital struc-
ture in the GLNF countries are now at least ‘invol-
untary’, mildly put. It should further be noted that
the productivity of the intermediate goods, which
had previously be measured by the angle α (β),
now turns out lower (higher) in the GIPS countries
(GLNF countries), as γ < α (δ > β).
In contrast to the first scenario, the mechanism of
the Target2 balances now induces the GLNF
countries to offer an involuntary excess supply of
consumer goods. This is accompanied by a reduc-
tion of their own expenditures for investment
goods. In other words the Target2 balances
enabled the GIPS countries to initiate an excess
demand for consumer goods and an increase in
investment spending.
A static welfare analysis of Target2 balances 
With the help of Figure 6 we can now conduct a stat-
ic welfare analysis. Here we compare the described
three scenarios by presenting the respective investor
and savings surplus: 
(i) Let us represent the hypothetical regime ‘Without
Target2 balances’ for the period mid-2007 to 2011
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by the two equilibrium points
at ‘autarky’ G and G’; the
corresponding solutions serve
also as reference solutions for
the subsequent assessment of
the welfare effects. 
(ii) From 1999 to mid-2007 there
were capital inflows (capital
outflows) in the magnitude
of FH or H’F’ respectively;
in both economic regions we
register a net welfare gain
corresponding to the area of
the triangles FGH and
H’F’G’ (vertically dashed), a
result that is well known
from textbooks. In detail: in
the GIPS countries the gains
in investor surplus (hatched
in grey) exceed the losses in
savings surplus (AGFB),
whereas in the GLNF countries the gains in sav-
ings surplus (B’F’G’A’) more than compensate
the losses in investor surplus (also hatched in
grey). We are very conscious of the fact that this
net welfare balance is still too optimistic.
(iii) The period from mid-2007 to 2011 – taking
account of the now effective Target2 balances – is
more difficult to assess. Let us start with the GIPS
countries: here we find gains in investor surplus in
the amount of AGHB (hatched in grey), in agree-
ment with scenario (ii). At the same time, there is
also a positive surplus now that on the one hand
must be assigned to savings, on the other hand
also to the Target2 balances: it corresponds to the
difference between the area KFHN (hatched diag-
onally) and the area AGFB (hatched horizontal-
ly). Overall, there are gains in surplus for savings
and for the Target2 balances. This means that the
scenario (iii), the Target2 scenario, results in net
welfare gains for the GIPS countries that exceed
those of scenario (ii). In contrast to this, the
active existence of the Target2 balances results
unambiguously in welfare losses for the GLNF
countries: now the modest (hatched diagonally)
area B’H’P’A’ (gains in surpluses to be assigned to
savings and Target2 balances) compares to the
considerably bigger sum of the (hatched in grey)
area B’H’G’A’ (loss in investor surplus, identical
to scenario (ii)) and the (hatched horizontally)
area N’P’G’K’ (losses in surpluses distributed
between savings and Target2 balances). The chief
result of this static welfare analysis is therefore
that the Target2 balances cause a net welfare
transfer from the GLNF countries to the GIPS
countries. For both country groups combined the
Target2 balances do not lead to any change in
welfare. This result matches the above statement
that the aggregate effects of the Target2 balances
on the European monetary base add up to zero.
A brief summary
This contribution has produced three results. First,
Target2 balances lead to a shift in the original mone-
tary base within the eurozone that cannot be con-
trolled by the ECB. Second, Target2 balances have, at
least for the countries with Target2 claims, involun-
tary and undesirable effects on their capital structure.
Third, Target2 balances cause a forced welfare trans-
fer from the countries with Target claims to those with
Target liabilities. 
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